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I. INTRODUCTION
The many participants in the bargaining process, each seeking optimum
gain, can acquire this gain only at the expense of each other or at the ex-
pense of the general public. Normally the gain of a bargaining unit is
related to its ability to create meaningful disruption. The ability of a par-
ticular interest group to create such disruption depends, in part, on the
composition of the individual bargaining unit.
The issue of craft severance presents to the decision maker, the National
Labor Relations Board, the propriety of grouping a particular interst group,
craftsmen, into an individual unit and thereby affording this group an in-
dependent power base. Apparently following the general belief that
minimizing industrial strife serves the public interest, the Board favors
aggregating workers into large industrial units which often combine differ-
ent interest groups, both craft and noncraft workers.' Achieving industrial
peace in this manner neglects other public interests in addition to those of
the immediate participants in the bargaining process. This article contends
that the present institutional grouping of workers may have a detrimental
effect on both craft interests and on the economy as a whole and that this
detrimental effect can be lessened if priority is placed on the severence of
multicraft units.
It is not asserted that the Board should aggregate all craftsmen into
multicraft units, a radical shift in policy which presently would be politi-
cally and institutionally impracticable. In the long-run, however, such a
policy would be economically sound and institutionally feasible. The
model for such a transition could be multicraft production and maintenance
units. Such units are already recognized by the Board,2 and all that is
necessary is a restructuring of many such units now locked into larger indus-
trial units. This restructuring can be effectuated by a liberalization of
craft severance policies.2
How the Board responds to petitions by unions seeking to represent
skilled workers can have serious consequences for employees, employers,
Member of the Tennessee Bar;, Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Misssisippi.
The Board does not usually articulate this motive, but it permeates practically all severance
decisions and appears to be the most rational motive in others, See, e.g., S. D. Warren Co., 144
N.L.R.B. 204 (1963); Hot Shoppes, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 138 (1961); Hot Shoppes, Inc., 130
N.L.R.B. 144 (1961).
2 See Armstropg Cork and its progeny described in detail in the discussion accompanying
notes 61 to 86 infra.
3 Craftsmen may petition the Board for representation apart from their present representative
(severance) or, if they are not presently represented, they may petition the Board for an elec-
tion to decide the issue of representation.
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and the public. A policy favoring the certification or severance of indivi-
dual craft units can result in featherbedding, restrictive membership prac-
tices, jurisdictional conflicts between unions, atomization of the bargaining
process, and a general breakdown of predictability in industrial relations
On the other hand, failure to satisfy the aspirations of skilled workers can
lead to a scarcity of skilled workers and industrial unrest. In either case,
the public suffers from decreased production and misuse of resources.
All participants in the bargaining process need continuity of produc-
tion. However, at times one or another of them may pursue a strategy
which disrupts production by engaging in a strike or lockout as a short-run
means of promoting its long-run interests.
To maximize power for the desired disruption, craft workers would pre-
fer to group in a bargaining unit which is capable of disrupting the entire
production process. 5 If they can achieve this grouping, they will be able to
establish the widest wage and status distinctions between themselves and
the semiskilled and unskilled workers. Because their wages will be a rela-
tively small percentage of the total wage bill, they will be able to utilize this
power successfully.
The industrial union must present a unified front to exert maximum
economic power and, of course, it will want to include the craft employees
in the industrial unit. To the extent that an industrial union is governed
by majority rule, the craft minority is subject to the willingness of the
industrial workers to preserve wage and status distinctions which satisfy
the craft workers. Thus, industrial union leaders are unwilling to include
provisions in the bargaining contract which particularly favor minority in-
terests, if by doing so they jeopardize their positions with the majority of
the union electorate.
The industrial employer's interest in the appropriate unit may vary with
each case. Facing a unified front presents positive advantages: settlement
will promote continuity of the production process and bargaining time will
be diminished. On the other hand, the employer may prefer to bargain
with many units; and if employee bargaining units are divided, he may gain
a favorable balance of power. Also, a relationship with a craft union has
some advantages, such as the use of craft hiring halls in securing skilled
labor. Finally, the general public's interest will be served if industrial strife
4 But see Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability it Labor Relations, 58 M icL L. REV. 313
(1960). Professor Jones contends that the extreme industrial unrest predicted for the United
States fostered by a liberal Board severance policy failed to materialize For a more detailed
discussion of his study see discussion accompanying notes 97 to 103 infra.
5It may seem that the narrowest bargaining unit, the individual craft union, would be more
in the interest of the individual craft However, this is not necessarily the case. Industrial work-
ers often will not honor the picket line of a striking craft group; and if the number of strikers is
few, supervisors and replacements can replace them and effectively diminish their power base.
However, if all the craftsmen in a particular field, such as maintenance, went on strike together,
effective replacement becomes much less likely therefore affording the strikers a power base in-
dependent of the cooperation of the industrial workers.
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is minimized and if enough workers are available to help fill the demand
for various items at the lowest cost.
This entire set of interests-the craftsmen's in bargaining apart from
the industrial workers, the industrial union's in maintaining the largest
possible bargaining unit, the employer's in minimizing the number of con-
tract negotiations or in enhancing his bargaining power, and the public's
in wanting peace and production-must be considered by the Board in
formulating the standards for deciding whether to grant a craft group's
petition for recognition.
Before evaluating the various standards individually, it may be well to
note some of the factors, apart from the act of severance or refusal to sever,
that influence the treatment of craftsmen. Sometimes an industrial union
or an employer may be willing to advance the standing of the craftsmen in
order to prevent the industrial unrest which could be caused by dissatisfied
craftsmen. Furthermore, because of their more developed skills and higher
income, the craftsmen may be able to exert the influence that their voting
power fails to provide. Thus, the presence of institutional safeguards
within an industrial union can attest to the adequacy of the representation
received by the craft group. The United Auto Workers, for example, gives
its craft members a veto power over contracts negotiated by the national
union with the auto industry.6 Furthermore, craftsmen may attain influ-
ential positions on important committees within an industrial union.'
Finally, the attitude of the Board towards craft severance directly influences
the ability of the craftsmen to obtain leverage within an industrial union.
The Board has adopted various standards for guidance in the selection
of competing claims to representation by craft and industrial unions. The
Board's choice between the two, often competing policy goals of industrial
stability and employee free choice of representation will determine which
claim will be granted. The tension between these two policies was stated
succinctly in Buddy L. Corp. :8
As we observed in Mallinckrodt, unit determination without regard to
balancing the effect on industrial stability and resulting benefits of a his-
torical plantwide bargaining unit against the wishes of a few members of
the unit for separate representation could well lead to an instability in
labor relations that could endanger the desirable goals that Congress
sought to achieve and bring on the evils that it sought to avoid as set out
in its policy declarations in the National Labor Relations Act. However,
to deny separate representation where to do so advances the cause of stabil-
ity little, if at all, might also carry the seeds of instability. We think
o That such ratification power is effective is demonstrsted by the continuance of a strike after
2000 industrial workers voted to accept the contract but 200 skilled workers refused to ratify it.
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. UAW, 287 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
7 For an excellent discussion of the power structure, containing examples from American
industry, see Weber, The Craft-Industrial Issue Revisited: A Study of Union GovCrnment, 16
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 381 (1963).
8 167 N.L.R.B. 808 (1967).
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that it might do so in the present situation, and, we also think that to deny
separate representation in the present case would be contrary to the policies
of the Act as it would deny employees the freedom of choice Congress con-
sidered as equally essential, in proper circumstances, to achieve the peace
and stability necessary if our commerce is to flow without interruptionY
The necessity to strike a balance between industrial stability and employee
free choice of representation has led the Board to a wide variety of solu-
tions. Yet, the continuing dissatisfaction of skilled employees, which is
sometimes exercised in ways that frustrate Board policy,10 and the continu-
ing shortage of skilled workers indicate the need for a new approach to
craft bargaining.
II. THE CERTIFICATION OF CRAFT GROUPS
AS INDEPENDENT BARGAINING UNITS
Because of the political difficulties involved in developing precise rules,
the inflexibility of such rules, and the changing strategies of the participants,
Congress charged the Board with the duty of defining the appropriateness
of a craft unit for collective bargaining."' Pursuant to its authority under
§ 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board initially developed
the American Can doctrine,'" which refused to allow craft severance if
there had been a history of bargaining on a broader basis. Congress rejected
this approach by amending § 9(b) in 1947; but, the Board soon adopted a
middle ground in National Tube.'3 Then in 1954 the Board took a position
closest to automatic severance,' 4 which was subsequently discarded in 1966
with the adoption of the Alallinckrodt functional approach.'* At the time,
most critics predicted that application of the iMallinckrodt doctrine would
result in a very restrictive severance policy; and history has proved their
astuteness.' 6
9 Id. at 809-10.
'DSee Lear Siegler, Inc. v. UAW, 287 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Mich. 1968), where is was as-
serted that the veto power of the craftsmen permitted what the Board had forbidden, i.e., a sep-
arate union.
1"Naional Labor Relations Act § 9(b), Ch. 372, § 9(b), 49 Star. 453 (1935), as amended
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
12 American Can Co., 13 N.LR.B. 1252 (1939).
3 National Tube Co., 76 N.LR.B. 1199 (1948). The Board rejected severence in four
industries, but liberally allowed it in others.
14 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.LR.B. 1418 (1954). The American Potash
doctrine allowed automatic severance if (1) the group seeking certification was a true craft group
and (2) the union seeking to represent the craft group was one that traditionally represented
that craft. Id. at 1422.
'5 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.LR.B. 387 (1966).
3. By a memorandum of June 24, 1968, the Executive Secretary of the Board advised the
Regions:
Since the Board's decision in Afallinkrodt Chemica Works which substantially changed
the American Potash doctrine, the Board has issued a number of decisions strictly
applying the standards established in ?ifallinckrodt. The thrust of all these cases indi-
cates that the Board will not sever from an existing production and maintenance or
1972]
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That the Board has demonstrated flexibility and a willingness to retreat
from what it deems to be an unsatisfactory policy reflects both an awareness
of the weaknesses of the various policies and the different attitudes toward
craft severance by various Boards. Perhaps the only thing that can be
gleaned from the relatively short and diversified history of Board severance
policy is that the Aallinckrodt doctrine is not likely to enjoy a long life.
Although the Board has frequently changed its general policy towards
severance, at the individual plant level it has consistently conditioned
severance on both the characteristic of the skill and the appropriateness of
the group for independent recognition. A petitioning group must first
demonstrate that it is a craft and that the unit is appropriate.7 The critical
characteristic of a craft has been consistently held to be an arduous training
program."' The tests of appropriateness, on the other hand, are more
difficult to describe because of the varying weight the Board has given to
such factors as the distinguishability of the unit,1" the extent of common
supervision, 0 the degree of integration of the unit into the employer's
production process,2' the experience of the petitioning union in representing
the type of craft,2 2 and the history of collective bargaining in the plant and
in the industry23
In addition to the above tests of unit appropriateness, there are two
other standards, each of which possesses the virtues of simplicity and defi-
niteness. One is to entirely refuse severance of craft groups as independent
bargaining units."  The other, the most liberal policy the Board could
adopt, is to grant automatic severance to a group once it has qualified as
a craft. Neither of these approaches is satisfactory, however, for the former
ignores the minority rights of a group having a legitimate claim to differen-
tiation from the semiskilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, the suppres-
sion of that claim may not lead to the desired stability because, in the ex-
other overall unit any craft, department, or other subdivision of such unit except under
very strong factual circumstances.
In the same memorandum the Regions were advised that most severance petitions could be dis-
missed without a hearing.
17 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397 (1966); American Potash & Chem.
Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418, 1422 (1954).
18 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.LR.B. 387 (1966); American Potash & Chem. Corp.,
107 N.LR.B. 1418, 1423 (1954).
19 Paxton Wbolesa!e Grocery Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 316 (1959).
20Drug Fair-Community Drug Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 843 (1967); Sparkle Mkts. Co., 113
N.LR.B. 790 (1955).
21 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 165 N.LR.B. 188 (1967); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works,
162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397 (1966).
22 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397 (1966).
23Mobile Oil Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. (1968); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.LRB.
387, 397 (1966).
24 Several Canadian labor relations Boards, the Ontario Labour Board, Alberta Board of In-
dustrial Relations, New Brunswick Labour Relations Board, Quebec Labour Board, and the
British Columbia Labour Relations Board, have adopted this policy. See E. HERMN, DIITE-
mINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 53-66 (1966).
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treme, craft groups that are unsuccessful in promoting their interests may
conduct wildcat strikes and tie up production in order to force the employer
to exert pressure on the industrial union to satisfy their demands. The
latter approach is equally unsatisfactory because it exalts craft interests to
the exclusion of those of the other employees, the employer, and the public.
Also, the liberal recognition of single craft bargaining units may give craft
unions the power to engage in practices which perhaps have led to the
present anticraft bias, e.g., featherbedding, restrictive membership," "whip-
sawing," and other socially wasteful practices. The Board has never com-
pletely refused to sever craft groups and at one time adopted a policy of
liberal severance.2 G However, for many years the Board has been develop-
ing the previously mentioned standards, which chart a middle course be-
tween no severance and liberal severance.
Probably the least subjective standard used by the Board is the historical
position of the petitioning craft group. -7 The elements to be satisfied in
deciding whether a craft group is historically qualified for independent
representation are that its members belong to a traditional craft and that
they have been inadequately represented by the industrial union. Histori-
cal criteria to determine craft qualification are simple and definite. Prece-
dential guidelines, established by custom and available to unions, em-
ployers, and the Board, can make the composition of a bargaining unit
highly predictable. Such criteria, however, ignore the dynamics of the
industrial world. For instance, technological change may produce work-
men who are as well trained as the members of existing crafts but whose
skills do not fall within traditional job descriptions. Conversely, technolo-
gical change may reduce a "skill" to a routine job.-8 Moreover, if the Board
25 Of course, industrial plants institute their own training programs and ostensibly restrictive
membership practices should not develop from such programs. However, plant managers are
not reluctant to hire trained craftsmen from other industries and, because the wage rate is held
down by the inclusive policies of the Board, there is always the desire to leave the industrial plant
after training and migrate to higher paying craft industries, for example, the construction indus-
try. Conceivably this migration from the industrial plants could affect the balance of power.
If striking industrial craft workers can find employment in other industries, management will be
hard-pressed for bargaining leverage. On the other hand, if severance is liberally granted and
the smaller units are able to raise their wages to a level that is competitive with outside crafts-
men, the flow may be reversed because of the nonseasonal nature of industrial work. If this
should occur, the restrictive membership practices of the outside crafts could be adopted by the
industrial craft units.
For a generally unappreciated view see Foster, Nonapprcntice Sources of Train ing in Con-
struction, 93 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 21, 22 (Feb. 1970). The author makes a strong case bascd
on a regional study in upstate New York that, for the most part, apprenticeship programs con-
tribute a small percentage of the total journeymen.
2 6 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.LR.B. 1418 (1954).
27 For a critical view of Board utilization of bargaining history see Abodeely, NLRB Craft
Severance Policies Pre-eminence of the Bargaining History Factor after Afallinckrodt, 11 B.C.
IND. & Coi. L REv. 411 (1970).
2 8 This need for a departure from past thinking of "traditional representative" was explicitly
recognized in fallinckrodt Chemical Works:
We are in a period of industrial progress and change which so profoundly affect
the product, process, operational technology, and organization of industry that a con-
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
relies on the adequacy of past representation, it loses objectivity because a
historical evaluation of the adequacy of past treatment necessarily involves
the Board's own concepts of employee equity and bargaining stability. 20
Another standard in determining the appropriateness of a craft bargain-
ing unit and one which can have substantial influence on the Board is the
inherent cohesiveness of the petitioning craft group. Employees who do
related work under similar conditions are said to possess a common interest,
The advantage in looking to the equality of treatment afforded workers in
similar situations is that these employees have, to a large extent, the same
needs. This standard has a substantial element of subjectivity, however,
because any perfectly homogeneous grouping would have to be so limited
as to be meaningless. The appropriate grouping thus depends upon the
decision maker's value judgment as to how expansive the limits of the class
should be.
A standard permitting the severance of a unit based on common super-
vision has some advantages. Because the group is supervised by a central
decision maker, a single craft unit isolates difficulties in the bargaining pro-
cess and also relates the problems of the craftsmen directly to the job they
perform. Nonetheless, such a grouping is subject to at least two serious
shortcomings. First, it makes no provision for craftsmen who, because of
their training and responsibility, seek treatment different from the rest of
the group. Second, since the level of supervision determines the member-
ship of the bargaining unit, choosing that level becomes a value judgment
with no defined criteria.30
The functional integration standard overlaps the standards of common
interest and common supervision. Nevertheless, the Board gives indepen-
dent consideration to the degree of integration of the employer's production
processes, including the extent to which the continued normal operation of
the production process is dependent upon the performance of the assigned
comitant upheaval is reflected in the types and standards of skills, the working arrange-
ments, job requirements, and community of interests of employees. Through modern
technological development, a merging and overlapping of old crafts is taking place and
new crafts are emerging. Highly skilled workers are, in some situations, required to
devote those skills wholly to the production process itself, so that old departmental lines
no longer reflect a homogeneous grouping of employees.
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 398 n.16 (1966).
29 Comments which appear objective, for example, that craftsmcn are paid on a par with their
counterparts in other plants or craftsmen are the highest paid workers in the plant, are subjec-
tive. The craftsmen in the other plant may be overpaid or underpaid depending on their bar-
gaining power. The same may be true for the craftsmen in the plant. See also materials cited
at notes 109 and 110 infra.
30 Any of the decision making units is important to the group directly affected by the decl.
sion. Undoubtedly the size or level of the unit will in turn be affected by the nature of the prob.
lem. A minor problem, such as regulations concerning where the smoking breaks will be taken,
can probably best be handled by the decision maker of a small unit, but problems of greater
magnitude demand attention by a decision maker of a larger unit.
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functions of the employees in the proposed unit.31 The elements which
establish functional integration are not dear, but if the craft group is inte-
grated into the production process so that its work is only an unidentifiable
portion of the whole, severance may be denied. The purpose of functional
integration as a standard is dear. Craftsmen who become a necessary com-
ponent of the continuous production process can, if given power as a single
group, inhibit the entire process with a small number of employees, whereas
craft skills which are not integrated can in the short run be eliminated or
replaced on a limited basis.32 The value of functional integration as a sole
standard is questionable, however, because it places complete emphasis on
one interest, continuity of production, to the detriment of what could be
the legitimate interests of a minority group. On the other hand, disregard-
ing this standard contributes to industrial friction in situations where there
is close interaction between skilled and unskilled workers.
Each of these standards is adverse to the interests of the crafts. By
relying only on the bargaining history of the craft itself or of the particular
group petitioning for recognition, the Board cannot focus on the current
dissatisfactions of the craftsmen. Regardless of how equitable the indus-
trial union treats the craft group, if the craftsmen imagine that they can do
better on their own, even if they can not, then their attitude will contribute
to industrial friction.-o Likewise, the standards of common interest, com-
mon supervision, and functional integration emphasize the objective char-
acteristics of the petitioning group rather than the reasons for which its
members desire independent recognition. Presently, the Board favors
industrial units which embrace the craft employees.34 Seldom will the
various standards used in determining severance coincide and even more
rarely will there be no factors present against severance. Since the Board
has given no ordinal value to the individual standards utilized in its deci-
sions, one is left with the feeling that consistent analysis is impossible. The
less obvious factor, the need of the craftsmen, is generally left undiscussed.-
31 Pervel Indus. Inc., 163 N.LR.B. 1037 (1967); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.LR.B.
387 (1966).
32 For example, maintenance can be sporadically performed by supervisors or a few replace-
ments, but tool and dye makers must continually work on tools used in the ongoing proluction
process; therefore, limited replacement is unlikely.
33 In the extreme this dissatisfaction may cause craftsmen to exercise intraunit power to
achieve safeguards which may be very disruptive, for example, veto power. Sce text accompany-
ing notes 108 to 114 infra.
34 For a survey of cases illustrative of present Board severance policy since MAf!linckrodt see
DuRoss, Craft Severance and National Labor Policy-the Aftcrnalb of Mallinckrodt, 30 U.
PrrT. L. REV. 577 (1969).
35 Aside from acting on purely economic considerations, the Board may be trying to preserve
the upward job mobility of semiskilled workers within a production unit which includes both
skilled and semiskilled workers. This policy was articulated in a recent decision, Zia Co., CCH
NLRB Dec. 5 20,605 (1969).
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRESENT LABOR BOARD PRACTICES
ON THE SUPPLY OF SKILLED LABOR
In the United States, where shortages of skilled labor due to relatively
full employment may be chronic, employers have had extreme difficulty in
finding qualified workers among the unemployed and have often turned to
foreign countries seeking skilled employees."' Moreover, the problem of
scarcity is not likely to disappear. A study by the United States Department
of Labor predicted four million skilled jobs will have to be filled between
1965 and 1975 because of economic growth and worker attrition. 7 An
important question, therefore, is whether the continuing failure to recognize
independent craft bargaining units may ultimately produce a serious defi-
ciency in the supply of skilled labor.3
To the extent that craft employees can negotiate better contracts, the
present Board practice favoring inclusive industrial units can lead to a de-
dine in the relative wage and nonwage differences between craftsmen and
other workers39 and can cause a horizontal difference in skilled wages for
the same job function depending on the bargaining unit. Moreover, a
social need is filled when craftsmen aggregate themselves into a group and
strive to distinguish themselves from the other employees.40 Unions have,
of course, always emphasized social fulfillment as a desirable side effect to
counter the hard business of collective bargaining. Perhaps this is what
the Board has in mind when it demands that a craft group seeking severance
demonstrate that it has maintained its identity through time in the indus-
trial unit.41
At the same time, in a society oriented to formal education, the prestige
of the craftsmen and his potential for promotion are also diminishing; yet
36 Bus. WEEK, Apr. 2, 1966, at 101. Because of the last two years of economic downturn
there may develop a glut of skilled workers. If so, the suggested Board policy should not change.
During such times there will be a diminution of apprenticeship programs, and when the economic
upturn comes skilled workers will be more scarce than ever.
3 7 Salr, Estimated Need for Skilled IVorkers, 1965-1975, 89 MONTHLY LAB, REV. 365
(1966).
38 Chamberlain and Cullen recognize that the shrinking of the wage differential between
skilled and unskilled workers can lead to a scarcity of skilled workers to an employer. They
suggest that this scarcity can be eliminated by raising the relative wage rates of the skilled em-
ployees. N. CHAMBERLAIN AND D. CULLEN, THE LABOR SECToR 426-429 (2d ed. 1971).
The contention of this article is that an employer enjoys no such freedom of contract if the crafts-
men are submerged within a predominately industrial unit.
39 The tendency is for union negotiators to insist on uniform increases for different classifica-
tions. This practice, of course, diminishes the percentage differential between skilled and other
workers. This practice changes when craftsmen acquire effective power within the unit. Soo
A. GrrLow, LABOR AND MANPOWER ECONOMICS 219-220 (1971).
40 Wage differentials also perform a social function. They help in determining social status
within the work group. Although often there are characteristics of the job which make certain
jobs more prestigious than others, the wage rates attaching to them in part symbolize and In
part create the social distinction in the work group. N. CHAMBERLAIN AND D. CULLEN, THE
LABOR SECTOR 296 (2d ed. 1971). See also Livernash, Job Evaluation, in EMPLOYIENT AND
WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 431 (Woytinsky & Assoc's. eds 1953).
41 Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397 (1966).
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the personal sacrifices to acquire a craft skill remain great. 2  Since an
apprenticeship is a typical prerequisite to becoming a qualified craftsmen, a
worker must undergo an extensive training program to acquire specialized
knowledge 3 During his apprenticeship, one is likely to earn less than he
could had he not chosen to become a craftsman but rather had gone directly
into the labor force as a nonskilled worker. Future rewards in increased
income or increased status are therefore necessary to encourage an employee
to forego present income. 4  While wages are not the only factor in choos-
ing an occupation," they are a dominant consideration,40 particularly in the
United States where status is directly related to income. Moreover, the
industrial environment has changed. The work of the nonskilled no
longer excludes all labor but that with a pick or shovel. Since today a
nonskilied employee works in an environment similar to his skilled counter-
part, conditions of employment alone are not sufficient incentives to induce
employees to enter a craft.
The studies available do not specifically attribute the decline in the
differences between craft and noncraft employees to the submergence of
craftsmen within large industrial units!-, Nevertheless, it is possible that
this structural grouping was a factor in the decline4
Robert Ozanne has concluded that:
(1) unionization had a substantial effect on skill differentials (craft
unions widening the differential and industrial unions narrowing
the differential), and
(2) skill differentials were influenced as much by internal pressures
42 "'The narrowing wage gap between production workers and craftsmen reduced the incen-
tive for young men to buckle down to the hard grind-and delayed earnings--of a long appren-
ticeship. Craftsmen lost status in college-oriented society." Bus. WEEK, Jan. 15, 1966, at 32.
43 Prolonged apprenticeship programs may be a union device for restricting membership in
hopes of gaining higher wages. Also, public education in the form of vocational high schools
and technical institutes is providing skilled workers, generally with a much shorter training
time than the traditional apprenticeship programs require. Nevertheless, some type of arduous
training is recognized as a necessary prerequisite for a craft. Sea note 15 supra.
44 A recent study by Wilkinson sheds some light on the relationship between the chcosing
of an occupation and the future promise of pecuniary reward. He demonstrates that the flow of
trainees into one profession can be disrupted by a relative change in the present value of lifetime
earnings of one profession with a comparable profession. W"lkinson, Present Va!-es of ife-
time Earnings for Different Occupations, 74 JOuR. POL ECON. 556 (1966).
45 Rottenberg states that the money wage will be the determinant only when all other deter-
minants are equal. Rottenberg, On Choice In Labor Mfarkets, 9 IND. & LAR. REL REv. 183
(1956).
4 6 Chamberlain has pointed out that the differential constitutes a basis for social distinction.
N. CHAmBERLAIN, THE LABOR SECTOR (1965).
47 There is no general agreement about the cause of the trend. Morgan cites as a possible
cause the coming to maturity of the industrial nations. C. MORGAN, LABOR ECONOMICS 120-
121 (1962), citing W. GOLDNER, LABOR MARKET FACTORS AND SKILL DIFFERENTIALS IN
WA.GE RATES 8 (1958). Goldner has contended that unionism is neutral as a cause in the
narrowing of the differential.
48 Perhaps the decline in differentials would have been less if separate craft negotiation had
always been the rule, but this is not to say that this would be preferable. Differentials could be
wider than warranted in some instances.
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(union policy and management and employee concepts of equity)
as they were by external conditions of labor supplyA9
Other studies have shown that although wage differentials between skilled
and unskilled laborers are now one third of what they were at the turn of
the century,50 the period of the greatest shrinkage was from 1935 to 1955,
when the balance of power in the United States labor movement shifted
from craft unions to industrial unions.51 The available empirical e'i-
dence is admittedly inconclusive and more studies are needed to substantiate
the theory. However, two studies from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
support the hypothesis.2
The most persuasive study concerns Western Greyhound Lines, Inc."
Maintenance employees are represented both by the Amalgamated Transit
Union (ATU) and by the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM). The bargaining unit represented by the ATU
consists primarily of unskilled or semiskilled job functions, whereas the
unit represented by the IAM represents skilled employees. The only com-
parable overlap is in mechanic positions. The job function of the automo-
bile mechanic written into the IAM agreement and the function of first
class mechanic in the ATU contract are essentially identical;04 yet the hourly
wage scale of the automobile mechanics in the unit represented by AT[ as
of March 1, 1970 was $4.52, while the hourly wage scale of first class
mechanics in the IAM contract as of June 1, 1970 was $5.89. Although a
comparison of vertical wage differences between skilled and other em-
ployees is impossible because the IAM unit has only skilled labor, the hori-
zontal difference between the same jobs is impressive.
Another study by the Bureau of Labor Statistics was made of Aluminum
Company of America.25 This study is more difficult to interpret because
of the multitude of job functions aggregated into 28 job grades. Roughly,
job grades 1-14 represent unskilled or semiskilled workers and grades
15-28 represent skilled workers. The average hourly wage of the un-
skilled and semiskilled workers in the units represented by the United Steel
4 9 Ozanne, A Century of Occupational Differentials i;n Manufaturing, 44 Rxw. EcoN. &
STAT. 292, 299 (1962).
5 0 L REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 467 (4th ed. 1964).
51 C. MORGAN, note 47 supra.
62 No biased selection process was responsible for the selection of these two studies. These
represent two studies from the Bureau's Wage Chronology series in which different unions
represent employees engaged in similar job functions.
53 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T oF LABOR, BULL. No. 1595, WAGII CHRO-
NOLOGY: WESTERN GREYHOUND LINES, 1945-1967 (1968).
54 "1st Class (mechanical)-capable of completely overhauling or rebuilding any unit on
motor coaches or trucks with the exception of electrical units .. " Council of Western Grey'-
hound Amalgamated Divisions, Agreement between Greyhound Lin.sAVest and the Council of
Western Greyhound Amalgamated Divisions of the Amalgamated Transit Union Relation to
Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions §200 (a) (1969), 76.
55 U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL., No. 1559, WAGE CHRO-
NOLOGY: ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA, 1939-1967 (1967).
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Workers of America as of June 1, 1967 was $2.97 and for the skilled
workers was $3.73. The average hourly wage in the units represented by
the Aluminum Workers International Union effective on June 1, 1967 for
unskilled and semiskilled workers was $2.99 and for skilled workers was
$3.70. The difference in the horizontal and vertical wage structure negotia-
ted by the two unions is so small as to be meaningless, which reflects the
apparent equality of the two groups (skilled and otherwise) in the bargain-
ing units. That the Steelworkers was originally a CIO union and the Alum-
inum Workers an AFL union made no difference in the differential.
These two studies are not sufficient to establish a theory, but the results
are consistent with the hypothesis. 6 Since the aggregation of craft and
industrial workers diminishes craft power, which in turn diminishes the
difference in wages, and since the aggregation of workers is a factor which
may affect the supply of labor, individual severance of craft units will not
be an optimum solution to this problem. Thus the Board's attitude that
individual craft severance is disruptive may be warranted and individual
representation may not lead to craft power because of the dependence of
individual craft units upon the support of the industrial workers .5
Although it is contended that the cause of the diminution of the differ-
ential is the lack of power of the craft employees in the bargaining unit, it
is not suggested that the Board adopt a power theory of unit certification.
Indeed, the Board rejected such a suggestion in Continental Baking Com-
pany.58
5 6 The author has been involved in two recent bargaining situations which verified the hypo-
thesis. One concerned a usual production and maintenance group submerged in an industrial
unit. The industrial workers were determined to narrow the differential between themselves
and the skilled employees. The employer tried to push through a wage increase for the skilled
group greater in amount than the increase for the industrial workers but the request was re-
jected. The company has been unable to hire a full complement of skilled workers at the bar-
gained wage. The other instance occurred in public employee bargaining. The union had in-
sisted on the inclusion of automobile mechanics in the bargaining unit, ostensibly to give upward
mobility to members of the unit. In the bargaining sessions this group was used as a "whipping
boy," and the union committee was determined to reduce the differential. An "across.the-
board" raise was the bargained result and the mechanic rate was markedly below the community
rate. Not only was the employer unable to hire mechanics at this rate, it was put in the position
of training mechanics who soon moved out into the private sector at the higher waze, a public ser-
vice by no means appreciated.
57 It might be asked why individual craft units in a plant would not have the same power
as a multicraft unit, even without industrial employee support, if the other craftsmen would honor
the picket lines of the striking group. The honoring of picket lines comes either from a strong
disdplinary procedure or through a sense of cooperation. Assuming arguendo that the crafts-
men were represented in several bargaining units and further assuming that the various locals
would discipline the members and would cooperate as is done in the Building Trades Unions,
the result would be one that the Board is trying to prevent, industrial unrest. Because of dif-
ferent severance dates, different contract expiration dates, and different lengths of bargaining
sessions (assuming no unified bargaining) disruption would increase. Moreover, the employer
would experience "whipsawing" by which each union would play off the gains of the others.
With the multicraft unit there would be only one bargaining period like the Building Trades,
but unlike the Building Trades there would be only one contract and each union would not be
free to make agreements with the employer.
58 99 N.L.R.B. 777 (1952).
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Continental Division asserts that in making unit determinations the
Board should favor that unit which gives to employees the greatest degree
of bargaining power. There are a number of objections to considering a
power factor in making unit determinations. In the first place, except for
opinions expressed in a few early Board decisions . . . the Board has
exclusively followed a mutuality of interest test in deciding what is an
appropriate unit. The relevant portion of Section 9 (b) of the Wagner
Act was reenacted without substantial change in the present Act. There
is not the slightest evidence that Congress intended to supplant or supple.
ment the mutuality of interest standard with a power factor test. See Sen.
Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 11. Under such circumstances,
it is a fair assumption that by reenacting Section 9 (b), Congress accepted
the Board's mutuality of interest standard for unit determination.
In the second place, we do not believe that, even considering Section
9 (b) together with Section 1 of the Act, as urged by Continental Division,
the inference is warranted that Congress intended that the Board should
consider the power factor in unit determination. Section 1 only discusses
inequality of bargaining power between employers and "employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract."
That is not the case here. In the third place, the application of a power
test would bring economic warfare to the forefront of collective bargaining,
instead of keeping it in the background where it belongs. Indeed, one of
Continental Division's objections to the present units seems to be that it is
handicapped by not being able to strike all Continental plants at the same
time. Finally, the Board would be faced with an impossible administrative
problem in trying to decide when equality of bargaining power does or
does not exist. For all these reasons, we reject the proposed power factor
as a test in unit determinations.59
On the other hand, one would be naive to overlook the obvious fact
that every severance decision is a power decision. The Board's focus, not
on power but on the results of aggregated power, keeps the decision less
political and permits a more objective evaluation. Therefore, when it
states, "First and foremost is the principle that mutuality of interest in
wages, hours, and working conditions is the prime determinant of whether
a given group of employees constitutes an appropriate unit . . . ,"00 the
Board is announcing a doctrine capable of evaluation. Certainly craftsmen
have a distinct mutuality of interest in wages, hours, and working condi.
tions. If the Board is to keep this group submerged in the industrial unit
and forbid it from effectively expressing its interest, then Board concepts of
the well-being of the skilled employees become highly subjective.
While the causes of the decreasing differences between skilled and non-
skilled workers may not be clear, the craft workers' resentment of the de-
crease may be at the root of much of the unrest of craftsmen in industrial
unions. Dissatisfaction with the practices of craft unions and with the
proliferation of separate craft bargaining units may be warranted, but the
59 Id. at 782 n.1l (citations omitted).
6o Id. at 782.
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conflict with employee free choice and instability is not irresolvable. Large
units and craft units are not necessarily incompatible nor are intraplant
craft units the only possibilities for craft unionism. Rather, some reconsid-
eration of the approaches of the Board to craft severence seems necessary.
No solution that tries to balance the two goals sought by the labor boards,
democracy and industrial peace, can optimize both these ends. It is suggested
that the solution approaching this optimization is the creation of multicraft
bargaining units.
IV. THE. ARiSTRONG CoiK DoCTrINE
A multicraft bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees
possessing different skills who are to be represented by one union for pur-
poses of collective bargaining. This multicraft concept was first recognized
by the NLRB in Amistrong Cork Company,' where the IAM petitioned the
NLRB in an original certification for representation of the maintenance
employees.6" The Board found that even when there is no bargaining his-
tory the maintenance employees of a manufacturing plant may constitute a
separate unit of the existing production group, if they so desire. Although
they would be a multicraft group, the maintenance employees possessed
common interests distinct from the existing group. The Board recognized
that the group lacked the inherent cohesiveness of a unit comprised of a
single craft, but nevertheless had some unstated interests in common,
presumably craft skills. Its holding was qualified by the statement that no
severance would be allowed if it would disrupt the stability of collective
bargaining relationships on a broader basis; but that when this danger is not
present, there is no reason to refuse the request.
Armstrong Cork was later overruled by American Cyanamid,03 but in a
second American Cyanamid4 decision the Board withdrew the first opinion
and let Anmstrong Cork stand. In the first decision, the employer con-
tended that its operations were highly integrated and that such a close rela-
tionship existed between maintenance and production employees that no
basis existed for separation into the proposed units, i.e., no separate skills.
Replying that it had previously rejected similar considerations, the Board
allowed separate representation in the absence of a bargaining history.
The opinion concluded that when another union seeks to represent a
broader group including the maintenance workers, no sound basis exists for
allowing the narrower unit, thus inferring that the broader unit is always
6180 N.LR.B. 1328 (1948).
62 The proposed unit included mechanics, electricians, welders, pipe fitters, carpenters, ma-
chinists, saw filers, toolroom men, welders and mechanics, mechanic and pipe fitter, truck driver,
mechanic-painter, and oilers. Id.
63 130 N.L.R.B. 1 (1961).
64 131 N.L.R.B. 909 (1961).
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more stable. 5 Although the Board considered the integrated operations
of the workers, the second American Cyanamid decision held that this was
a factual distinction unsupported by substantial evidence.00
In the first American Cyanamid decision Chairman Leedom pro-
tested the ipso facto decision to allow the broader unity7 The dissent of
Board Member Fanning applied the "no history of bargaining on a broader
basis" test and added that the decision by the majority did not allow enough
-flexibility "to meet new problems in specialized areas with new solutions."08
He agreed with the self-determination doctrine of § 9(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act and concluded that the maintenance group was bomo-
genous and distinct.69 The factual inadequacies and faulty reasoning of the
majority revealed by the dissenters previewed the second American Cyana-
mid decision.
On reconsideration, the Board reversed itself and found that the main-
tenance group was appropriate because
(1) operations were not so integrated as to cause the group to lose its
identity as a separate function;
(2) a community of interest existed;
(3) the group was readily identifiable; and
(4) while absence of a comprehensive bargaining history does not esta-
blish the appropriateness of a separate unit, a case by case empirical




(c) other factors of separate identity affected by automation, tech-
nological advances and other forms of industrial advancement.70
The second American Cyanamid decision examined institutional factors
more carefully than the Armstrong case and therefore cannot be regarded
as having simply adopted Armstrong Cork principles. Armstrong Cork
did not rely on the definitive criteria upon which both American Cyanamid
decisions based their determination of the craft versus the noncraft issue.
Thus, the second American Cyanamid decision generalized some criteria,
but more significantly, it established a range of values on which a functional
and more realistic determination of appropriateness could be made. Even
considering the factual distinction which caused the Board to reconsider
the first American Cyanamid case, it seems obvious that the redetermination
employed criteria more encompassing than the Armstrong Cork decision.
Further, while "bargaining history" is couched in dynamic terms in the
65 American Cyanamid Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1,2 (1961).
G0 American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909,910 (1961).
67 130 N.LR.B. at 3 (Leedom, Ch., dissenting).
08 130 N.LR.B. at 3 (Fanning, M., dissenting).
69 Id. at 4.
7 0 American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909 (1961).
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second American Cyanamid decision, the terms actually rely on some test
that Arnstrong Cork omitted.-' It may be that the factual differences in
operations of the two plants explain the variances between Armstrong Cork
and American Cyanamid. A more reasonable interpretation permits an
analysis utilized in American Cyanamid with standards not used in Arm-
strong Cork.
Many cases refer to Armstrong Cork as controlling, yet the multicraft
doctrine has been modied so much that it is difficult to predict those occa-
sions when the group will be certified as a bargaining unit. Common in-
terests is a criterion which has been followed in most cases. However, there
has been no consistent definition of the concept. Sometimes the common
interest is the skill of the employees,-" while other times it is common
supervision 7 3 work function of the employees,7 4 or even the functional
interchange of the employees.7 5
The ad hoc application of the various standards announced by the Board
make it very difficult to determine when a unit is ripe for severance. Arm-
strong Cork negated severance of an established bargaining unit, yet sever-
ance has been allowed where there was a history of prior bargaining7
Prior bargaining history has not been attributed to a successor plant,77 al-
though as an indicator of harmonious employee relations it might be rele-
vant. Many decisions have not allowed a separate unit when functional
integration exists,78 but precedents are available which have not allowed
integration to frustrate severance.-9 Sometimes the Board requires complete
departmental separation, 0 however, instances occur when this requirement
is waived.8'
The case of United States Time Corporation2 illustrates the freedom
from rigidity which the Board enjoys. The Board stated:
The 'Union and Intervenors further contend that the unit in which an
election is requested by the Employer is inappropriate because it is multi-
71 Criterion 4 of the Supplemental Decision is particularly unique and criterion 1 is certainly
not a rephrased statement of criterion 3 in the Armstrong Cork dedsion.
72 Buddy L. Corp., 167 N.L..,B. 808 (1967); Weston Biscuit Co., 81 N.LR.B. 407 (1949).
73 Celanese Corp. of Am., 84 N.LR.B. 207 (1949).
74 G. Fox & Co., Inc., 155 N.L1LB. 1080 (1965); F. W. Woolworth Co., 144 N.LR.B.
307 (1963).
75 Burndy Corp., CCH NLRB Dec. 5 21,701 (1970); Celanese Corp. of Am., 84 N.L.R.B.
207 (1949).
76Jay Kay Metal Specialties Corp., 163 N.L1RB. 719 (1967); National Biscuit Co, 88
N.LR.B. 313 (1950).
77 St Regis Paper Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 454 (1949); sce B. F. Goodrich Chem. Co., 84 N.LR.B.
719 (1967).
7SMallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.LR.B. 387 (1966); Wah Chang Albany Corp., CCH
NLRB Dec. 5 22,456 (1968).
7 9 Halliburton Portland Cement Co., 91 N.LR.B. 717 (1950).
SO Mathieson Chem. Corp., 100 NJ..B. 166 (1952).
81 Goodyear Engr Corp., 100 N.LR.B. 973 (1952).
82 108 N.LR.B. 1435 (1954).
1972]
118 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
craft. However, insofar as appears from the record, such unit comprises
all the maintenance employees of the Employer. The Board has been
reluctant to sever such a maintenance group from an existing production
and maintenance unit, where to do so would disrupt stable collective-
bargaining relations on a broader basis. Where, however, there is no
controlling collective-bargaining history on a broader basis, the Board has
found that the maintenance employees, as a multicraft group, possessing
separate interests from those of production employees, constitute a separate
appropriate unit. In view of the absence of any recent bargaining history
on a broader basis, we conclude that the earlier plantwide bargaining his-
tory does not preclude the finding that a unit limited to the Employer's
maintenance employees is appropriate for bargaining purposes.83
The results of the decisions, which developed the Armstrong Cork
doctrine and rely on it for authority, illustrate that no well-defined guide-
lines exist in the Board's severance policy. Although Mallinckrodt has an
air of definiteness in its statement of six criteria, 4 these criteria have all
been used in previous Board decisions and it would require a large dose of
optimism to speculate that predictions for severance will prove more accu.
rate in the future. 5
An examination of these and other cases suggests several ways to analyze
the trend which has followed Anmstrong Cork:
(1) The Board has not been careful with its prose.
(2) Vague criteria allows more flexibility in the decisions by the Board.
(3) A factual distinction exists in each of the other cases which necessi-
tated changing the criteria which had been applied in Armstrong
Cork.
83 Id. at 1436-37 (footnotes omitted).
84 The following areas on inquiry are illustrative of those we deem relevant:
1. Whether or not the proposed unit consists of a distinct and homogeneous group
of skilled journeymen craftsmen performing the functions of their craft on a nonrepeti-
tive basis, or of employees constituting a functionally distinct department, working in
trades or occupations for which a tradition of separate representation exists.
2. The history of collective bargaining of the employees sought and at the plant in-
volved, and at other plants of the employer, with emphasis on whether the existing
patterns of bargaining are productive of stability in labor relations, and whether such
stability will be unduly disrupted by the destruction of the existing patterns of repre-
sentation.
3. The extent to which the employees in the proposed unit have established and main-
tained their separate identity during the period of inclusion in a broader unit, and the
extent of their participation or lack of participation in the establishment and mainten-
ance of the existing pattern of representation and the prior opportunities, if any, af-
forded them to obtain separate representation.
4. The history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry involved.
5. The degree of integration of the employer's production processes, including the
extent to which the continued normal operation of the production processes is depen-
dent upon the performance of the assigned functions of the employees in the proposed
unit.
6. The qualifications of the union seeking to "carve-out" a separate unit, including
that union's experience in representing employees like those involved in the severance
action.
162 N.L.R.B. at 397 (footnotes omitted).
8G Mallinckrodt added very little to the criteria laid down in the second Amicrcan Cydnamid
decision.
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(4) The Board has become more sophisticated and is in the continual
process of the development of standards to be used.
Probably all these factors have contributed to the flow of inconsistent
decisions. While the Board's opinions lack consistency, the multicraft
concept, fostered by Armstrong Cork, still has ample precedent for future
development."'
V. MULTICRAFT BARGAINING UNITS
Widespread implementation of the multicraft concept does not require
the development of new standards for the determination of the proper unit,
but rather requires an extension of present Board policy in original repre-
sentation proceedings into the severance area. The Board's willingness to
approve multicraft units in several proceedings contrasts sharply with its
reluctance to sever multicraft units. However, even the restrictive Board
practices in severance cases are speckled with analogous precedent for the
extension of multicraft bargaining. Finally, the theoretical framework in
which all unit determinations are made-balancing the employees right to
select the union responsive to his particular needs with the need for indus-
trial stability-increasingly affords an ample predicate upon which to base
the multicraft system.
VI. MULTICRAFT UNITS IN OIUGINAL
REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS
Concern that skilled employees be adequately represented and a feeling
that a multicraft unit can effectively represent a group with varying skills
frequently combine to prompt the Board to grant skilled workers separate
representation in original proceedings.ar Indeed, the Board rejects the
idea that a craft unit is proper and effective only when composed of workers
possessing similar skills"' and with rare consistency favors multicraft repre-
sentation to a single craft representation in original proceedings!0
Opinions denying multicraft representation in favor of plant-wide bar-
S See, e.g., Monsanto Co., CCH NLRB Dec. 5 22,015, at 28,324 (1970) (Fanning, AL, dis-
seating), where Member Fanning chides the Board for ruling as it did but refusing to over-
rule American Cyanamid.
87 See Armstrong Cork Co., 80 N.LR.B. 1328 (1948). Sco also Allied Chem. & Dye Corp.,
120 N.I.-B. 63 (1958) (listing similar cases in which certification was granted); Dundee
Cement Co., 170 N.LY.B. 422, 425 (1968) (Fanning, MK, dissenting).
8 8 See, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co., 80 N.L.1LB. 1328 (1948), where a muldcraft unit was
deemed appropriate to represent "mechanics, electricians, welders, carpenters, pipe fitters, ma-
chinists, saw filers, toolroom men,.. :'etc. Id.
89 See, e.g., Magma Copper Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1 (1956) and National Carbon Co., 107
N.L.R.B. 1486 (1954), where a single craft representation was denied but multicraft represen.
ration approved. See also Armstrong Cork Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1328, 1328 n.1 (1948); "We find
it unnecessary to discuss the alternative unit [the single craft unit) in view of our finding that
the departmental unit is appropriate." In one case the Board approved a multicraft unit despite
a history of singlecraft representation.
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gaining are characteristically devoid of meaningful explanation of the
Board's holding,90 although they do convey the impression that the Board
has no objection to multicraft representation, but merely feels that in the
given situation craftsmen can be properly represented by a plant-wide unit."
Since the union seeking to represent the craftsmen cannot appeal and since
the employer is rarely interested in doing so, the Board is seldom required
to explain its reasoning to the appellate courts. " Cases in which the Board
has rejected multicraft representation detract from, but do not annihilate,
the years of precedent for separate multicraft units. The consistent position
of the Board is that multicraft units are proper if no plant-wide unit is
desired . 3 Member Fanning, a frequent dissenter to Board action denying
a separate unit, often observed the inconsistency of saying that a multicraft
unit is always appropriate if no plant-wide petition is pending, but that it
may not be appropriate when there is a petition pending. 4
Thus, several conclusions are apparent. The Board is convinced that
multicraft units frequently provide appropriate representation for workers
with varying skills. When no plant-wide petition is pending, multicraft
representation is uniformly granted. A multicraft unit is preferred by the
Board to single craft units in original representation proceedings. Cases
denying a multicraft unit hinge not upon a feeling that a multicraft unit is
inappropriate or ineffective, but rather upon a feeling that adequate
representation of craftsmen will result from plant-wide bargaining.
Employer feelings on the multicraft idea are difficult to infer from the
reports. Generally, the employer opposes the petition for a separate unit
and files a brief in support of the union seeking plant-wide representa-
tion. But this is by no means the employer's only position. Cases are re-
ported in which the employer took no position and in which the employer
favored a separate unit.96 Employer action may, however, be motivated
by campaign tactics rather than by true feelings on the desirability of sepa-
rate representatives because the present Board policies make severance un-
likely. Further, since in these cases the employer may be unaccustomed to
bargaining, he may feel that initially it is preferable to face only one union.
90 Dundee Cement Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 422 (1968), denying separate representation to dec.
trical maintenance workers.
91 Id.
92 See Cohen, Two Years under Mallinckrodt: A Review of the Board's Latest Craft Unlt
Policy, 20 LAB. LJ. 195 (1969).
93 Dundee Cement Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 422 (1963); American Cyanamid Co., 130 N.L.R.B,
1 (1961).
94 Dundee Cement Co., 170 N.LR.B. 422, 425 (1968) (Fanning, M., dissenting).
9 5 Fort Die Casting Corp., 115 N.LR.B. 1749 (1956); Davison Chem. Corp., 105 N.L.R.B.
925 (1953).
96 American Cyanamid Co., CCH NLRB Dec. 5 20,181 (1968); Westinghouse Elec. Corp,,
84 N.L.R.B. 213 (1949).
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VII. SE VERANCE OF MULTIcRAFT UNrTs
The reluctance of the Board to sever multicraft units97 is puzzling when
compared to the relative favor with which the Board greets original appli-
cations for multicraft representation. Seemingly, the consideration which
led the Board to allow multicraft representation at the outset would carry
forward into the severance cases. However, this has not been the case
and there has been no explanation of this policy difference." However,
this is not to say that the Board is unconcerned with the proper representa-
tion of craftsmen in established units. Clearly this consideration has always
weighed heavily with the Board in the traditional cases of single craft
severance. 9  The implication is that the Board opposes severance as such
and not separate representation. Indeed, Board opinions treat as axiomatic
the proposition that severance is disruptive.100
Approximately three years after the Board promulgated its most liberal
severance rule in American Potash, Professor Dallas Jones undertook a
study to determine the effects of that decision on stable labor relations.10'
He surveyed industrial relations directors of the companies involved in all
severance decisions from the date of the Potash decision until June 1, 1957.
The majority of the directors reported that they believed that the effect of
the decision was not conducive to stable labor relations. However, the ques-
tionnaire included questions designed to investigate the actual effect of
severance. In some of the companies the severances led to the industrial
problems feared by most labor directors, i.e., jurisdictional disputes, exces-
sive wage increases, and the possibility of further fragmentation. But
these problems arose in only a minority of cases. Some employers believed
that the liberal severance policy was conducive to stable labor relations.
However, even this group expressed some fear that unlimited severance
could become a problem.
A somewhat universal problem resulting from severance is the resultant
increase in negotiation time. This was a fear in both the employers who
were opposed to severance and to those who had no opinion on the sever-
ance policy. Overall, Professor Jones concluded that a liberal severance
policy had not been nearly as disruptive as it could have been. He pre-
9 7 FortDie Casting Corp., 115 N.L.I.B. 1749 (1956).
98 "Thus, while we find the Mallinckrodt tests useful in our determination of the appropriate-
ness of the unit requested here, we will not apply the same measure in dealing with whether
an appropriate craft unit should initially be established as we would in considering ,whether
severance should be granted from an established bargaining unit." Fremont Hotel, Inc., 163
N.LR.B. 115, 117 (1967).
99 The manner in which the plant-wide union treats the craftsman has been a factor to which
the Board has always looked. See, e.g., Wah Chang Albany Corp., CCH N.LR.B. I Dec. 22,456
(1968).
1 0 0 This doctrine can be traced back to the first severance case, American Can Co., 13 NJ-LR.B.
1252 (1939), in which the Board stated that craft severance "would make stability and respon-
sibility in collective bargaining impossible." Id. at 1256-57.
l01 Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations, 58 MIC-L L REV. 313 (196o).
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dicted that if limitations were put on the severance policy the situation
would not become as acute as feared. The experience showed that stability
was inversely related to the number of units severed.
Data in support of the Board's opinion that severance encourages disrup-
tion is elusive. The usual suggestion seems to be that forcing an employer
to deal with more than one union may be disruptive and lead to costly tie-
ups of production by minority groups.102 Possibly there is some feeling that
two unions cannot coexist in one plant. However, such arguments avoid
the issue, for presumably if these factors influenced the Board, it would be
more favorably disposed to multicraft severance than to single craft sever-
ance, which has not been the case. 03 More importantly, if the suggested
objections were valid, they would undercut the Board's permissive policy
in original proceedings because the evils feared would be the same whether
the separate system was established through severance or through initial
recognition. One is left with the conclusion that it is the very act of sever-
ance which the Board fears.
Arguably, severance of multicraft bargaining units would be more
offensive to existing plant-wide units than the severance of traditional crafts
because multicraft severance results in a larger reduction of existing unit
membership. Such considerations might be a basis for Board reluctance
to sever multicraft groups were it not for the fact that the Board has tradi-
tionally severed certain departmental groups such as power house em-
ployees.10°
Under the Potash'05 criteria there might have been justification for the
Board's reluctance to sever multicraft units, for its policy was that tradi-
tional craftsmen should be afforded traditional representatives. Thus,
multicraft severance was unnecessary because craftsmen were entitled to
responsive representation by unions concerned with their welfare alone.100
The abandonment of the Potash test led some to believe that the Board
would be more favorably disposed to multicraft severance, which has not
resulted.10 7 Therefore, the Board has been required to make the same
determinations in original representation cases, departmental severance
cases, and traditional craft severance cases as it would be required to make
if confronted with petitions for severance of a multicraft union. For
102 "The withdrawal of the work of a handful of craftsmen from among a large working
force will effectively dose the plant. There is no smaller group, except management itself,
whose abstention from productive effort will produce so complete a paralysis." Kerr & 1?isher,
Mfultiple-Esployer Bargaining: The San Francisco Experience, in INSIGHTS INTO LABOR IS-
SUS 25, 44 (R. Lester & J. Shister eds. 1948).
10 3 Fort Die Casting Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1749 (1956).
1 0 4 Crocker, Burbank and Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 774 (1948).
105 American Potash & Chem. Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954).
10 6 Fort Die Casting Corp., 115 N.L.R.B. 1749 (1956).
10 7 See Du Ross, Craft Severance and National Labor Policy-the Aftermath ofl allinckrodt,
30 U. PIrT. L. REV. 577 (1969).
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example, who are craftsmen and what groups are homogeneous are recur-
rent issues in these determinations. There appears to be no reason why the
expertise and experience of the Board derived from the three former types
of cases should not be carried over and applied to multicraft severance.
VIII. INDUSTRIAL STABILITY AS A PREDICATE
FOR THE MULTICRAFT CONCEPT
Determination of the proper unit is always made with a view toward
maximizing the employees' right to choose a representative who will
effectively represent their interests while at the same time minimizing indus-
trial unrest.1 8 The balance which the Board may strike at one time may
later prove inadequate when conditions have changed. The severance
tests which the Board has promulgated indicate a responsiveness to chang-
ing conditions in the craft industry. Reexamination of the traditional sever-
ance test suggests that multicraft severance should also be reexamined.
Present conditions dictate that a new balance be struck in order to
achieve stability. Mallinckrodt'0 9 was thought by some to indicate Board
willingness to be more permissive. 110 This has not been the case. 1
Several groups of craftsmen have been able to obtain a veto power over
plant-wide contracts." 2 At least one court has upheld such action 1 and
so has the Board." 4 To the extent that craftsmen are able to achieve a
veto, the effects would be more disruptive than multicraft representation."
The extent to which craftsmen need a veto indicates the need for assurances
of fair treatment from the plant-wide unit.
Wide implementation of the multicraft concept offers relief to dissident
craftsmen without the proliferation of bargaining units of single craft
representation. It is a middle road to stability and fair treatment of craft
workers and one which is available to the Board within the formula of
10 See Buddy L Corp., 167 N.LR.B. 808 (1967). Sce also Comment, The Derelo ment of
the Craft Severance Doctrine, 11 ST. Louis U.LJ. 615 (1967)
'
0 9 MIallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.LR.B. 387 (1966).
110 See 8 B.C. IND. & COM. L REV. 988 (1967). This author like most others was only
optomisric about the success of craft units to sever if the Afallindrodt standards were liberally
applied.
"' DuRoss, supra note 27.
12 E.g., the UAW gives this veto power to craft employees.
113 Lear Siegler, Inc. v. UAW, 287 F. Supp. 692 (W. D. Mich. 1968). The Court upheld
the right to the veto against the contention that such a veto when used to continue a strike that
the majority of industrial workers wished to end constituted an illegal secondary boycott by the
craftsmen in contravention of the Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (4) (i) (C), 49
Stat. 452 (1935), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970).
114 Chrysler Corp., Nos. 7-RC-8185 through 7-RC-8195 and 7-RC-8209 through 7-RC-8211,
decisions of the N.L.R.B. Regional Director (Aug. 1, 1967).
115 There may be some virtue in having only one disruption, but the complete work stop-
page by a minority is less desirable than leaving the employer at least the option of attempting
to replace striking craftsmen.
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Mallinckrodt and within the framework of prior Board practice in original
representation proceedings and departmental severance.
IX. SINGLEPLANT VERSUS MULTIPLANT-MULTICRAFT UNITS
If amalgamation of separate craft employees into larger multicraft units
is to be the predicate for future Board policy on the premise that this will
lessen industrial strife while allowing craftsmen a better opportunity to
achieve their demands, it might be asked why amalgamation of all crafts.
men in two or more plants might not better achieve these ends. The issue
of multicraft-multiplant units is pertinent to Board policy, but it is not the
same issue as separate craft representation.11
Present Board certification policy concerning multiplant units is built
on a functional framework. Only that much resembles the present craft
certification policy. Generally, a history of multiplant collective bargain-
ing will be determinative; 17 but lacking this, the community of interest,"1
the functional integration,"" the level of supervision, 120 and the functional
interchange of employees12' are the relevant factors. Undoubtedly such a
functional policy is devised to promote minimal disruption and to further
assure that the common needs of the employees at the various plants will be
met by a sensitive representative.
The certification issue in craft versus industrial representation is con-
cerned more with the status of the employees and the legitimate unique
needs attributed to that status. Once the Board recognized that the craft
and public needs can best be served by craft bargaining, the issue of how
large the craft units should be becomes a functional decision for the Board.
Certainly this decision can be effectively made under the present framework.
It might be argued that multicraft aggregation will create one of the
same problems that concerns the Board in its consideration of multiplants
units, the fear that employees who are not functionally related will be
represented by a union which is not sensitive to the special problems created
by this lack of functional relationship, e.g., special problems created by
integration into a production line that are related to the production line.
116 It might be thought that this tendency for preservation of existing memberships, for-
mally incorporated in the 1955 "No-raid" AFL-CIO policy, would be an insurmountable deter-
rent to implementation of multicraft severance, but this view overlooks the willingness of other
international unions who are neither de facto or de jure parties to the agreement. Even the parties
to the agreement do not uniformly honor it and if the multicraft concept is fostered with the re-
sulting possibility of a larger unit and greater gain, the pressure to raid will become more intense.
Craftsmen may petition the Board for representation apart from their present representative
(severance) or if they are not presently represented, they may petition the Board for an election
to decide the issue of representation.
1
7 V.LP. Radio, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 113 (1960).
118 North Am. Aviation, Inc., 131 N.L.RB. 399 (1961).
119 Renuart Lumber Yards, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 631 (1961).
120 Barr's Jewelers, 131 N.L.R.B. 235 (1961).
121 Carter Camera & Gift Shops, 130 N.L.R.B. 276 (1961).
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There is a possibility that some craftsmen will be put in a unit that will not
serve them as well as an industrial unit. However, exceptions to the multi-
craft unit should not be permitted for these occasional craftsmen because
the adverse effects on the craftsmen as a group are more than offset by a
grouping that will be more sensitive to their financial and societal needs.
X. CONCLUSION
Inconsistencies in Board severance policy would seemingly be explained
away if the Board were committed to the proposition that a larger unit is
always more stable. However, such a policy would demand that multi-
craft severance be preferred to single craft severance. Such a policy would
also demand that craft employees exercise no independent control over
acceptance of the bargaining agreement. Even if the Board would follow
a consistent policy aimed at the largest amalgamation of employees, the
resultant emphasis on stability at the expense of all other interests would
not be warranted. Other public interests, such as the promotion of a free
flow of labor and the preservation of the industrial democratic tenet of
employee free choice, rate strong consideration in striking the final balance.
Flexibility is a necessary element in any Board policy. The two-part
test of status and appropriateness applied to any craft group seeking sepa-
rate recognition should continue to be applied. It is within these parts
that flexibility should be the norm. The Board should continue to base its
decision of whether the petitioning employees qualify as craftsmen on:
(1) The length and rigor of the craft training program; and,
(2) The nature of the work performed after training.
The necessity for the first requirement is obvious. If craftsmen are to
be put in a position of greater bargaining power, the acceptable reason for
doing so is that years of sacrifice expended to acquire superior skills merit
higher rewards.
The necessity for the second requirement is not so obvious. The separa-
tion will probably lead to a higher wage scale and differential between
skilled and other workers. These differences should relate to the economic
function of the employees; and if they are not performing a craft function,
the benefits which accompany aggregate craft bargaining should be denied.
Historically, craft wage rates have been governed by the general value of a
skill rather than by the economic circumstances of a particular industry or
by the actual work performed. The employer essentially is paying for the
whole reservoir of talents possessed by a qualified joumreyman.'2
An employer may have to pay more for the services of a journeyman even
though he does not regularly utilize his skill. But it is wrong to allow this
22 Chandler, Craft Bargaining, in FONTm-RS OF COLLE CTVE BARGAINING 50, 60 (J.
Dunlop & N. Chamberlain eds. 1967).
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individual to utilize the group bargaining power of those who are perform-
ing a more valuable function.
After determining that the employees qualify zs craftsmen, the Board
should not decide the question of certification aut:omatically. Instead, it
should remain flexible by evaluating the circumstances of the individual
case according to the following guidelines:
(1) The community of interest of the employees; and,
(2) The importance of the functional integration of the production
process.
The community of interest of the employees should be defined so as to
emphasize the interest of the group as craftsmen. Perhaps one reason to
continue an existing group may be said to exist when the unit appears to
operate smoothly. But the filing of a severance petition with the requisite
30 percent interest 23 is evidence of discontent and it is difficult to see what
more the craftsmen should have to do to establish discontent. Certainly
the Board would not wish to follow a policy that encouraged wildcat strikes
or other forms of disruptive conduct.
Continuity of the production process is a goal common to all parties and
when that process is disrupted society suffers least from a minimum amount
of disruption. Therefore, it may be more important to society to place
craft workers who are integrated in a continuous production process into a
unit in which they are unable to bargain apart from the industrial workers
involved in the process. Perhaps in Mallinckrodt the Board thought that
the continuity of the production process for the defense effort outweighed
the other factors which might have justified severance. Reasons such as
this should be stated so that a flexible yet predictable body of severance
decisions could develop. To refuse severance because the craftsmen are
functionally integrated is warranted only when the Board considers the
production critical:
The craft wage is sometimes an announced factor in the Board's decision
on severance. But the Board will not be able to make the best overall
decision by a comparison with other plants' "4 or by deciding that the crafts-
men are the highest paid workers in the particular plant.' 25 The craftsmen
in other plants may be underpaid or overpaid depending on their bargain-
ing power. The relative wage scale within the particular plant is an equally
unreliable factor. Therefore, the Board should opt in favor of multicraft
severance unless continuity of the production process compels a different
123 Boeing Airplane Co., 86N.L.R.B. 368 (1949).
124 "Petitioner failed to introduce any evidence regarding a comparison of wages paid to the
employees in the classifications which the Petitioner seeks to represent and those employees in
similar dassifications working elsewhere." Lear Siegler, Inc., 170 N.LR.B. 766, 771 (1968).
12 5 Jay Kay Metal Specialties Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 719 (1967); Wah Chang Albany Corp.,
CCH NLRB Dec. 5 22,456 (1968).
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solution. The wage will then be determined by bargaining power, i.e.,
competitive market power.
Although the degree of unrest caused by craft bargaining may be less
than is generally believed, fragmentation generates friction and restrictive
craft practices retard technological change. Moreover, the trend toward
centralization of industry should not be obstructed by craft units. How-
ever, the reorganization of craft employees into multicraft bargaining units
can simultaneously promote craft representation without the present short-
comings which accompany single craft unionism. In addition, this amalga-
mation would give craft unions an opportunity to resolve some of the prob-
lems of the occupational differential which historically have plagued
cooperation. If craft unions represent not only their own craft, but others
as well, there would be a tendency to organize councils or other joint
associations in order to reach a proper wage differential between the various
craft occupations.12 " The specialized nature of many of the existing craft
unions would thus become broadened in the interests of multicraft repre-
sentation.
The rigor of a lengthy training period necessarily means that there will
be fewer craftsmen than workers of lesser skills and that in a competitive
market the craftsmen will be able to command higher wages. Thus, even
if they are not allowed to bargain competitively with their employers, they
should be able to demand higher wages than less skilled employees. This
principle has been universally recognized by the Board, so the real issue
concerns the manner in which this equity is to be realized. Over the years
the Board has demonstrated that when it is not satisfied with its solutions
it is willing to adopt new approaches to the problem. However, neither a
return to the permissiveness of Potash, the middle ground of National
Tube, nor the present restrictive policy of Afallinckrodt offers a satisfactory
solution.
It has been asserted that any aggregation permitted by the Board leads
to increased power which necessarily increases the opportunities for disrup-
tion. But this undesirable possibility is more than offset by the increased
ability of craftsmen to bargain for their needs. On the other hand, the
freedom to bargain is not unlimited and it should be scrutinized and cur-
tailed in all instances when it is not in the national interest. Yet even with
these restrictions, multicraft units will strike the best balance between em-
ployee democracy and industrial stability.
126 This kind of cooperation is not only possible but is being done voluntarily by ten unions
which bargain for one binding contract with Ingalls Nuclear Shipbuilding Division as the con-
solidated Metal Trades Council.
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